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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of blockholders on bank valuation. We use two measures of 
bank valuation, namely Tobin’s Q and market to book ratio, and two measures of 
blockholders, namely number of blockholders and total ownership of all blockholders. Using 
a sample of publicly-traded bank holding companies in the U.S. from 1996 to 2001, we find a 
negative relationship between total ownership of all blockholders and bank valuation, but a 
positive relationship between number of blockholders and bank valuation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most important methods of corporate governance is concentrated ownership, 
which is a direct way to align the interests of management and shareholders, so 
concentrated ownership must be an essential factor to influence the value of firms. Previous 
literature indicates that generally there is a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value (Haw et al. 2010). These negative impacts may include lower 
firm value, poorer earning information credibility, lower stock returns, and weaker 
profitability (e.g. Claessens et al., 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002). For example, a recent research 
documents negative effect of concentrated ownership on banks, including poorer 
performance, greater return volatility, lower cost efficiency and higher insolvency risk (Haw 
et al, 2010). However several scholars hold a different view that concentrated ownership 
increases firm value, which put much weight on controlling shareholder’s alleviation effect to 
the agency problem between managers and shareholders. More about previous literature 
concerning concentrated ownership to value of firms and banks in particular is discussed in 
section 2—Previous Literature. 
 
This paper focuses specifically on the impact of concentrated ownership (blockholders) on 
value of banks because researches’ discussions about role of blockholder ownership in 
merely banks are not sufficiently enough. Moreover, banks have additional features and 
problems affecting banks’ governance, which gives reason to the separated investigation.  
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On the one hand, agency conflicts exist not only between managers and shareholders, but 
also between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and for banks, the 
conflicts can be more severe due to problems stemming from intrinsic properties of financial 
institutions (Busta et al., 2012). Firstly, banks with concentrated control usually have 
connections to business conglomerates, making banks an easy tool for tunneling, by 
adopting slack lending policies to the interest vested companies (Laeven, 2001). Secondly, 
opacity of bank assets, high leverage and the accordingly heavy regulation result in insider 
expropriation. Moreover, controlling owners may take excessive risk in decision making, due 
to moral hazard originating from the deposit insurance system, thus harming minority 
shareholders’ interests (Pathan, 2009; Haw et al., 2010). 
 
On the other hand, several features of banks make their corporate governance more 
complex than non-financial institutions. Firstly, banks are more highly leveraged than 
non-financial institutions, which give banks an incentive to shift risk. Secondly, banks 
opaqueness provides banks with opportunities to shift risk, thus increasing bank failure 
probability and systemic risk. Thirdly, a large fraction of bank’s depositors are diffuse 
depositors. They may use deposit insurance to protect their assets, thus weakening the 
monitoring role of debt holders of banks. Maturity mismatch between bank’s debts and 
assets increases liquidity risk, also contributing to depositors’ needs for deposit insurance. In 
addition, as banks are large creditors to real economy, governance of bank may have 
substantial effect on real economy’s capital allocation. Finally, deposit insurance that banks 
are exclusively subjected to and prudential regulations may alter the traditional channels of 
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banks’ corporate governance. Due to above brief analysis, it is necessary to examine 
particularly the impact of ownership concentration to bank value. (Details are discussed in 
“What’s different about banks” in the appendix.) 
 
The empirical part of this paper makes use of a panel data set of publicly-traded bank 
holding companies in the U.S. from 1996 to 2001. The empirical model is a multiple linear 
regression model, with Tobin’s Q and Market to Book Ratio to represent bank value, and two 
major explanatory variables—number of blockholders and total percentage of shares held by 
blockholders in a bank to represent blockholder ownership in a bank. The results show a 
negative effect of concentrated ownership on bank valuation, as indicated by the fact that 
the more total shares held by blockholders is, the less the value of bank would be. One 
possible explanation for this result could be that the presence of a large outside shareholder 
reduces managerial incentive to search for new investment projects. We also find that there 
is a positive relationship between number of blockholders and bank valuation, which may be 
explained by blockholder’s impacts concerning “voice” and “exit” theory and the fact that 
multiple blockholders have a monitor function to the largest blockholder, thus preventing 
the largest shareholder from only concerning his private interest on the cost of the 
well-being of the bank and other shareholders. (Detailed discussion please see results and 
conclusion part.)  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
literature of blockholder and firm valuation. In section 3, data, variables and empirical model 
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are described. Section 4 reports and explains empirical results, then gives robustness checks. 
Finally, section 5 gives conclusion.  
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Dispersion of ownership and blockholder 
 
During the past few decades researchers point out that the managers might have inadequate 
incentives to maximize a company’s value as they are not the owners. Naturally, people 
realize that this may give rise to unexpected erosion in shareholder’s interest. As a result, 
increasing attention to such agency issues, also referred to as a separation of ownership and 
control, can be found around 1930s.  
 
A study by Berle and Means (1932) reveals that the company tends to be in small groups (e.g. 
between families and friends) where the owner is also the manager at the beginning of 
Industrial Revolution period. However, the ownership starts to diffuse with the rapid 
development of science and technology since it is hard for individuals or small groups to 
raise adequate fund to support such expansion. Berle and Means not only discuss separation 
of ownership and control, but also provide data analysis on the management ownership 
issue among a vast number of companies in US. They warn that this diffuse of ownership 
would threaten the existing economic order and how the conflict between shareholders and 
managers would happen. Two years later, a legal document is published and therefore, by 
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law the interest of diffuse stockholders is protected against the professional managers.  
 
Since it has been said that the managers don’t have adequate stake in the company, the 
function and benefit of large blockholders start to raise people’s interest in the academic 
field. Researchers are eager to find out whether the existence of blockholder in a company’s 
ownership structure would have impact on the firm value. 
 
2.2 Theories that blockholders can increase firm value 
 
2.2.1 “Voice” theory of blockholder 
 
Hirschman (1970) first introduces two concepts of corporate governance that blockholders 
could adopt within the firm. The first one “voice” is for large shareholders to exert direct 
intervention to the firm, such as giving different investment plans, voting against others. The 
other one, “exit” (also known as “Wall Street Rule”) is for large shareholders to sell shares 
against the chance that managers do harm to the firm value. Blockholders could improve the 
firm value through these two approaches of governance.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) point out that blockholder would increase firm value by three 
approaches of intervention of investing strategy. The first method is to pay for the takeover 
of small shareholders and get majority control of the company. The paper shows that if the 
blockholder begins with higher value of initial stake, the restructuring gain would increase. 
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Small shareholders sell their shares for lower price because that they desire less 
restructuring gain. As a result, this lower cost of takeover would, on the other hand, benefits 
the blockholder’s control. Second, the blockholder could impose his will by changing his 
favorite directors. In this way, the blockholder is likely to have better investing result which 
could offset the cost of changing directors and asking for votes from other investors. The 
third way involves informal negotiations with the company in the form of writing letters or 
emails, for example. Shleifer and Vishny then concluded that ownership concentration, to 
some extent, improves the management control and as a result, the existence of blockholder 
would increase the firm value. 
 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) discover that managers can entrench themselves by using 
anti-takeover provisions instead of stock ownership. Among 551 sample data from US firms 
between 1979 and 1985, it is found that well-informed institutional owners have greater 
incentives to vote for their interest more consistently. 
  
Besides the prevalent finding of more hard-working managers, there are other possible 
suggestions within the relationship between blockholder and firm value. One of these 
explanations is considered as reverse-causation problem. It lies in the fact that the 
blockholder himself accumulates more private profit through stronger control over the firm. 
This finding is revealed by Barclay and Holderness (1989). They first realize that the stock 
price of some companies with blockholders trades at premium. Then they explain it is 
because a number of such owners with large block have private benefits of corporate 
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governance. Two years later, they published their further study about the ownership. Barclay 
and Holderness (1991) adopt event study to show that blockholder ownership can achieve 
significant positive investment performance only when takeover or other restructure follows. 
They also confirm that the investors with acquisition of a large equity position have 
incentives to enlarge their size as time being and this may enhance the blockholder’s impact 
on the company. 
 
Huddart (1993) analyzes the benefits of large shareholders by concentrating share ownership. 
He states that blockholders can gain precise and expensive information about the manager’s 
effect to make investment decisions and to modify the compensation contract. As 
blockholders have stronger incentives to monitor, better output would be met and this will 
enhance the firm value ultimately. 
 
Similarly, Admati, Anat and Pfleiderer (1994) build a model to demonstrate that a 
blockholder would increase a company’s profit by costly monitoring. In addition, the 
free-rider issue is discussed: most small shareholders incur no cost since they can enjoy the 
benefit provided by the large investors who are willing to intervene. Since this model only 
dealt with one large shareholder in a firm, they conclude that under the equilibrium in the 
model, all shareholders, big or small, passive or active, hold the market portfolio of risky 
asset. Otherwise, they argue that a potential loss can be met in risk-sharing when the 
concentrated ownership is diffuse. 
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Winton (1993) demonstrate that the concentration of the ownership, such as the size of 
blockholders, would have influence on the firm value. It is not hard to imagine that bigger 
size of the large shareholders has direct link to stronger incentive to intervene. Size matters 
with respect to the effect of “voice” in corporate governance. 
 
The effectiveness of “voice” not only depends on block size as mentioned above, but also on 
liquidity. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) explain that once a firm’s shares are traded in public, 
the stock price would mostly reflect the company’s performance. The degree of liquidity in 
the stock market determines the amount of information revealed from the stock price. As a 
result, the manager would have stronger incentives to enhance better performance of the 
firm. However, here it involves a cost that shareholders would need to pay for trading with 
new investors. In order to offset possible loss of money mentioned above, the shareholders 
are allowed to pay less to buy shares. As a whole, the trade-off improves the performance 
monitoring and promotes better managerial effort within the firm. 
 
Based on previous study, Maug (1998) further investigates the trade-off issue between 
liquidity and governance when the large shareholders are monitors. His finding is based on 
the hypothesis that liquid stock markets allow investors giving up their equity shares more 
easily and it reduces the blockholder’s incentives to intervene. However, he point out that 
the more liquid a stock market, the easier to repurchase other shares for the large investors. 
Thus, when liquidity satisfies, the existence of a blockholder enables the governance more 
effective.  
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Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) study the relation between public trading and the 
blockholder’s private incentives who can influence the firm value. Since a blockholder is an 
“insider” who can make investment decisions to add value to a firm value. They discover that 
if a large shareholder liquidates his stake before the public awareness of his incentives to 
take part in adding-value activities, the blockholder would benefit from this behavior. The 
public trading information makes the blockholder’s stake value more relevant to his 
incentives.  
 
However, not all the blockholders expertize at giving investing strategy. Some may be good at 
analyzing historical data to evaluate a company’s current value. In addition, the interference 
mentioned above is not always easy to undertake such as the takeover of small shareholders.  
 
2.2.2 “Exit” theory of blockholder  
 
When the blockholder fail to exert his governance through “voice”, he may turn to “exit”. 
From the perspective of blockholder trading and market efficiency, Edmans (2009) gives 
detail analysis about how the blockholders can encourage better investment decisions for 
long term. He argues that the blockholders have stronger incentives to enhance the 
fundamental value of the firm than other small shareholders. Based on “Wall Street Rule” 
trading on private information, the will of blockholders is inclined to represent the intrinsic 
value instead of the current stock price. Thus the existence of the blockholder would be 
beneficial to the firm in the long run.  
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Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) put it in a similar way: large shareholders can ease the 
contraction between managers and other shareholders by the threat of “exit” from private 
information. They develop a model to show that the threat of “exit” does decline the agency 
cost and it can impact managerial decisions successfully. 
 
Similar to “voice” theory, the liquidity also exerts peculiar effect. Edmans (2009) 
demonstrates that blockholders tend to trade more aggressively with the private information. 
And it also allows them to sell more from the negative information. As a result, the 
blockholders gain larger initial shares. On the whole, liquidity enhance the manager’s 
incentives to pursue higher market value of the company.  
 
2.3 Theories that blockholders can reduce firm value 
 
On the other hand, some other researches take the position that the existence of a 
blockholder can reduce a firm’s market value. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that though 
blockholders with concentrated ownership may act very efficiently for their interest, they can 
be ineffective in redistributing wealth from other shareholders. They argue that managerial 
opportunism, either in the form of expropriation of the shareholders or of misallocation of 
the investment funds, reduces firm’s profit. They discuss the case that large, controlling 
owner can expropriate minority shareholders.  
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Bukart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) challenge the idea that the large outside shareholder is 
always advantageous to the firm by reducing managerial discretion. They reveal that the 
presence of large outside shareholder would reduce the managerial initiative and 
noncontractible investments. Their model implies that a negative relationship between 
blockholder ownership and firm valuation is possible.  
 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) discover that the company with larger institutional ownership 
or large stake shareholders would have lower bond yields and better debt rating. However, 
they argue that the controlling owners might focus on their own benefit without considering 
other small shareholders when they have stronger control over the firm.  
 
Similar result is shown by Dyck and Zingales (2004) that blockholder can destroy the firm 
value by its over-control. Aghion and Tireole (1997) highlight the difference of formal and 
real authority: in the formal case, managers should be responsible for making investment 
decisions, but in the real world, it can be assigned to their subordinates; managers can miss 
out some expensive but real good deals under the excess pressure of blockholders.  
 
Bolton and Von Thadden (1998), focusing on the liquidity issue, develop a simple model of 
ownership structure and compares benefits in the firm with different ownership 
concentration. They point out that the existence of a controlling block in a firm would 
destroy the company’s market capitalization because this would limit the number of 
shareholders participating in the trading of the stock and therefore, poses a negative 
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influence on liquidity of the stock market. Dyck and Wruck (1998) reveal from their sample 
that some blockholders give permission to the managers to dilute the stock price from other 
small shareholders.  
 
2.4 Single blockholder vs. multiple blockholders 
 
Following the finding that the existence of blockholder adds value to the firm’s market value, 
the theoretical papers cannot draw a conclusion to determine the number of blockholder 
which adds the best possible profit to a firm. (See an overview by Becht et al. (2003))  
 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted on this issue. Kyle (1985) proposes 
seminal insider trading and builds a model to show that a single blockholder would limit his 
possible profit from the trade in order to hide his private information. Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992) then argue that multiple blockholders would trade more aggressively. 
La Porta et all (1999) attempt to identify the ultimate blockholder within large companies 
among 27 affluent countries. They reveal that only few of these corporations are widely held, 
which is different from Berle and Mean’s finding of ownership structure. And thus, it is 
inappropriate to apply any empirical finding from one country to another. Holderness (2009) 
reviews this topic “The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States” and points out that 
the case in US should not be made an exception among other countries which have similar 
corporate governance and blockholder structure.  
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Before Holderness (2009), there are indeed some empirical papers in favor of this point of 
view. Lehmann and Weigand (2000) use the data of 361 stock-market listed and unquoted 
companies in Germany over the period of 1991 and 1996. They find that controlling 
ownership by families would have a negative impact on the firm’s return on assets and by 
contrast, the controlling ownership by banks or institutes would pose a positive effect on the 
firm value. They claim that the presence of a single blockholder is not linked directly to the 
profit of the firm but adding one more blockholder is shown to have obvious benefits to the 
firm. Faccio et al. (2001) reveals that the presence of multiple large share ownership in 
Europe would enlarge the company’s dividend payout and the case in Asian is exactly the 
opposite. Gugler (2003) continues La Porta et al (2000) and Faccio et al. (2001)’s study, he 
also tests the dividend pay-out ratios for a panel of firms and find that the presence of one 
blockholder leads to significant lower pay-out ratios and the presence of multiple large 
shareholders would hinder such influence due to the fact that other investors with large 
shares would have a monitor function on the largest blockholder. Volpin (2002) use a sample 
of Italian companies and show that multiple blockholders enhance better market value of a 
firm than those with only one large shareholder.  
 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) reveal that with one more equal size of votes among the large 
shareholders, it would pose a significant positive effect on the firm value from a sample of 
Finland public-traded listed firms. This finding is particular significant when the controlling 
shares are by families. They explain that families tend to have similar private benefits. Thus, 
they conclude that the identity of the controlling shares determines the relationship 
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between the multiple blockholders and the firm value. Andres (2008) makes a similar 
discovery that the controlling ownership by families perform better than other firm with 
other type of controlling ownership. They use a sample of 275 public-traded listed 
companies. 
 
Busta et al. (2012) based on a sample of commercial banks among 17 wealthy countries 
between 1993 and 2005 and have different observation with La Porta et al. (1998). Their 
discovery remains the same about the negative effect between multiple blockholders and 
the bank value within Germany. However, it poses positive effect in Scandinavian countries. 
It is explained that these differences are due to the diverse shareholder protection policies 
between controlling holdings by families and institutional companies. For example, Germany 
has lower protection on shareholders and thus negative influence on the market value can 
be observed.  
 
3. Sample, variables and model 
 
3.1 Sample and variables 
 
This paper makes use of a panel data set of publicly-traded bank holding companies in the 
U.S. from 1996 to 2001, obtained from banking research datasets of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. We go to WRDS Database to download CRSP Monthly Stock File from 
1996 to 2001, filtering to only leave December data. This is for calculating market value of 
equity for all the listed banks. For other variables in our model, we obtain year-end 
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accounting data from the Federal Reserve’s Y-9C database.  
 
Our sample consists of 370 observations of the listed banks from 1996-2001. As indicated by 
table 1, there are 55 to 68 banks per year from 1990 to 2006. The changes of number of 
annual sample size may be due to mergers and acquisitions, new entry, and failure during 
the sample period. 
 
Table 2 reports the distribution of the number of blockholders across all the 370 bank-year 
observations. There are 240 observations in our sample that have 1 to 4 blockholders, which 
stands for relatively concentrated ownership, while there are 126 observations associated 
with no blockholder, which stands for diffused ownership. Thus, banks in our sample vary 
widely regarding the number of blockholders. 
 
Table 3 gives brief definition of variables used in our model. Below is detailed explanation of 
the variables used. 
 
Tobin’s Q is primarily used as an indicator of bank value in our empirical analysis. As shown in 
table 3, Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value 
of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. It is designed to measure how much 
the present value of future cash flows comprises the replacement cost of tangible assets, 
which brings out one advantage of using q that there is no theoretical reason to account for 
risk or leverage when using q to compare firms (Laeven and Levine, 2007). However, there 
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are two concerns often brought up when using q to estimate bank value. First, banks are 
extremely highly leveraged. Second, when financial assets constitute a large fraction of 
bank’s tangible assets, market value and replacement cost are identical for the large part of 
assets (Brook et al., 1998).  
 
We follow Caprio et al. (2007) and use Market to Book ratio as an alternative way to measure 
bank valuation. It is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. It is 
designed to compare what investors are willing to pay at present to a conservative measure 
of the value of the firm. Market value is determined in the stock market through its market 
capitalization. Book value is calculated by looking at the firm's historical cost, or accounting 
value. 
 
Numblks and Sumblks, which represent number of blockholders and total fraction of shares 
held by blockholders, are used as major explanatory variables, indicating the degree of 
ownership concentration in a bank. The rest five variables: Size, Capital, Loans, Asset 
Diversity, and Deposits are control variables in our model. 
 
Firstly, we control for bank size, calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. We use 
natural logarithm of total operating income as an alternative to measure bank size in 
robustness check. Size is an important determinant of profitability. On the one hand, large 
banks may have economies of scale and scope, thus having higher profitability. Moreover, 
large banks are better diversified and hence tend to have lower firm specific risk and be 
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better able to invest in high-risk, high-return projects. On the other hand, it is possible for 
large banks to have diseconomies of scale and scope, therefore having lower profitability 
(Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1987). Based on above discussion, the relationship 
between bank size and bank valuation is indeterminate. 
 
Capital ratio, defined as book value of equity divided by total assets, also affect the value of a 
bank, because firstly, capital could absorb loss against unexpected shocks, and secondly, 
shareholders have an incentive to reduce risk taking in decision making considering the 
capital they hold (Hellmann et al., 2000). Thus, we expect a positive relation between capital 
ratio and bank valuation. 
 
We calculate Loan to Asset ratio by dividing the amount of loans by the amount of total 
earning assets. This ratio measures the composition of a bank’s earning assets. Because the 
yields on bank loans are usually higher than those on investment securities, we expect a 
positive impact of loan to asset ratio on bank valuation. 
 
We use Asset Diversity ratio to control for diversification of a bank. It is a measure of 
diversification across different types of assets, and calculated as follows: 
 
1 − |
net loans − other earning assets
total earning assets
| 
 
where other earning assets include securities and investments, total earning assets is the 
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sum of net loans and other earning assets. The value of asset diversity ranges from 0 to 1, 
the higher the value is, the more diversified the bank is. 
 
Deposit to Asset ratio is a leverage ratio that defines the total amount of deposits (debt) 
relative to assets. The higher this ratio is, the higher the leverage. Higher leverage gives 
incentive for risk shifting: owners of the highly leveraged banks tend to take more risk once 
debt has been sold than the depositors expected when they bought the debt, which can 
increase banks’ riskiness and the probability of bank failure, and bring about the threat of 
systemic risk. Based on the above analysis, we expect a negative relation between Deposit to 
Asset ratio and bank value.  
 
3.2 Empirical model 
 
To examine the relation between value of bank and ownership concentration, indicated by 
number of blockholders, and total percentage of shares held by blockholders, we estimate 
the following multiple linear regression model: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where i denotes a bank in our sample, t denotes a year over the sample period, 𝜃𝑡 are year 
fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡 are two 
ways of measuring the value of a bank. They represent values of publicly traded banks in our 
sample, and are used in two different equations to make the result rigorous. 
 
In order to make the model sound, the year fixed effects 𝜃𝑡 are used to control for possible 
structural changes in the banking industry over time, or in other words, to control for some 
macro factors which would affect valuation of all the banks in our sample in a particular year. 
To ensure that our results are not driven by outliers, we winsorize both Tobin’s Q and the 
market to book ratio at the 1% and 99%.  
 
In robustness checks, we use an alternative measure of bank size, log (total operating 
income), to replace the original one: log (total assets). We also add two more control 
variables, Growth in Assets and Growth in Loans, to control for growth opportunities. And to 
control for mergers and acquisition, we exclude bank-year observations in which the total 
assets of the bank increases by more than 50% (as in Laeven and Levine, 2007). 
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4. Empirical results and robustness checks 
 
4.1 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics. The Tobin’s Q and Market-to-book for an average 
public traded bank in our sample are 1.176 and 2.827 respectively. As two comparable bank 
valuation variables, they both have 370 observations and have some variation as indicated 
by the standard deviations of 0.296 and 1.359 respectively. The average Tobin’s Q is slightly 
bigger than the one reported in Laeven (2007), which is 1.06. The number of blockholders 
for an average bank in the sample is 1.181. The banks with 2 blockholders lie in the upper 
quartile of our sample and the median of number of blockholders is 1. As also shown in Table 
2, among 370 observations, 112 publicly-traded banks in our sample only have a single 
blockholder while 126 of them have no blockholders and others have multiple blockholders. 
The mean of percentage of shares held by all blockholders is 11.379 with a standard 
deviation of 13.830 which is relatively large. The average bank size is 16.967 and the average 
book value of capitalization is 0.091. The ratio of loans to total earning assets has a mean of 
0.741 and this number is larger than the 0.66 in Laeven (2007). The asset diversity has a 
mean of 0.447, which is smaller than the 0.58 in Laeven (2007). Since the asset diversity 
takes value between zero and one, the bank with bigger value of asset diversity has more 
thorough diversification between lending and non-lending activities. The ratio of deposits to 
total assets has a mean of 0.694 and a standard deviation of 19.9%.  
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Table 5 presents the detailed pair-wise correlations among our variables and we have the 
following observations. First, the size of a bank is negatively correlated with the both the 
number of blockholders and the percentage of shares held by all blockholders, implying that 
blockholders tend to hold smaller ownership at larger banks. It can be explained that it is 
difficult for any investors to hold a large ownership at a large bank. Second, the number of 
blockholders is positively correlated with the book value capitalization of the bank (equity/ 
assets) suggesting that the presence of multiple blockholder helps a bank to become 
well-capitalized. Third, the negative (although not significant) association between the 
number of blockholders and the ratio of loans to total earning assets suggests that the banks 
tend to engage in more diversified financial activities with one or more blockholders.  
 
A number of correlations between other variables are worth noting. First, the size has a 
negative association with the book value capitalization of the bank (equity/assets). This is 
consistent with Demsetz and Strahan (1997)’s conclusion that larger banks are more likely to 
maintain lower capital ratios. Second, size is positively correlated with the ratio of loans to 
total earning assets. A possible reason lies on the fact that large banks tend to gather more 
subsidized funding easily. Third, the negative correlation between deposit and the size is 
expected. The reason lies on the fact that larger banks have the privilege to borrow more 
funds, such as commercial paper, while smaller banks tend to rely on deposit.  
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4.2 Regression results 
 
Table 6 reports regression results with dependant variables Tobin’s Q and the ratio of market 
value of equity to book value of equity respectively. As shown in the table, in these two 
regression models, the coefficients on the number of blockholders and the capitalizations 
are positive and significant while the coefficients on the percentage of shares held by all 
blockholders, the bank size, the ratio of loans to total earning assets, asset diversity and the 
ratio of deposits to total assets are negative and significant.  
 
The coefficient on the number of blockholders is positive and significant suggesting that the 
presence of more blockholders would enhance the firm value. Possible explanations could 
have been told by Hirschman (1970) that blockholders can exert direct intervention to the 
firm in order to enhance better investment project (“voice “ theory) or they can sell shares in 
case that managers would harm the firm value (“exit” theory). This empirical result is 
consistent with previous papers of Lehmann and Weigand (2000) with a sample of 361 
stock-market unquoted companies in Germany between 1991 and 1996, Faccio et al. (2001) 
with a sample of firms from Europe, Volpin (2002) with a sample of Italian companies and 
Busta et al. (2012) with a sample of commercial banks over 17 wealthy countries between 
1993 and 2005.  
 
Second, the coefficient on percentage of shares held by all blockholders is negative and 
significant, which suggests that the more shares owned by the large investors, the lower 
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value of the firm would occur. This can be explained by Burkart et al. (1997) that larger 
percentage of ownership by a blockholder can kill managerial incentives to search for new 
investment opportunities.  
 
Third, both Tobin’s Q and the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity are 
negatively correlated with the bank’s size. As widely acknowledged that size may have 
certain influence on the company’s performance and valuation, we discover that larger bank 
size would lead to lower market value of the bank itself, which is similar to Demsetz and 
Strahan (1997)’s observation that larger banks bear riskier lending activities due to its better 
diversified advantage however it may lower its firm value at the same time. This finding 
differs from Laeven (2007), who reveals that bigger banks would have higher value.  
 
Fourth, the positive and significant coefficient on the book value capitalization of the bank 
(equity/ assets) confirms that a well-capitalized bank may lower their incentives to get 
involved in superlative risk-taking activities (Laeven, 2007).  
 
The negative (although not significant) coefficient on the loans / total earning assets 
indicates that banks with more traditional fundamental activities, such as activities 
specialized with making loans, would have lower valuation. The negative coefficient on asset 
diversity variable further confirms the conclusion of Laeven (2007) that the specialization of 
the bank has profound influence on the valuation. In addition, the ratio of deposits to total 
assets has a negative association with the bank valuation, suggesting that banks with higher 
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percentage of deposits would have lower market value.  
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
 
To gauge the robustness of our results, we run several additional tests. The results are 
reported in Table 7. First, in Regression (1), we obtain similar result as the original regression 
model, except that this regression adopts an alternative measure of size, the log of total 
operating income. Second, we control for the past performance of the bank by including the 
growth in total assets and growth in loans respectively in Regression (2) and (3). We find that 
even if we include the growth rate in assets and in loans respectively, the results still show 
that the number of blockholders has positive and significant influence on the bank valuation 
while the percentages of shares of blockholders has negative and significant effect. In 
Regression (2) and (3), the impact of other control variables remains the same as the original 
regression model. Next, in the fourth regression model we leave out the observations where 
the asset of a bank grows by more than 50% within a year. Our main results continue to hold. 
All the regressions above, we include both the number of blockholders and the total 
ownership of all blockholders as indicators of blockholder. If we remain the same control 
variables and only include the number of blockholder or the total ownership of all 
blockholders in the regression respectively, the result is no longer statistically significant. This 
may further confirm Edman and Manso (2011)’s finding that both blockholder variables 
affect the valuation as a whole and it is important to include both of them in the regression 
model. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Since the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, investors have been searching every possible 
approach to improve bank valuation. One important question is whether blockholder 
ownership helps. Our findings shed some light on this question. This paper identifies how 
blockholders affect the bank valuation with a sample of US publicly-traded banks between 
1996 and 2001. We employ a number of control variables that may affect the valuation, such 
as bank’s size, asset diversity, ratio of loans to total earning assets, and the ratio of deposits 
to total assets. Through a series of robustness checks, we observe a positive correlation 
between the number of blockholders and the bank value. Some explanations of this result 
are as followed: multiple blockholders tend to trade aggressively, which helps the bank raise 
money from the financial activities (Subrahmanyam, 1992); the presence of multiple large 
shareholders would have a monitor function on the largest blockholder, which could prevent 
the largest shareholder from only concerning his private interest (Gugler, 2003); multiple 
blockholders strengthen the discipline of managers through competitive trading which would 
promote higher managerial effect in the firm (Edmans and Manso, 2011). We also find that 
higher percentage of shares held by all blockholders would reduce the bank value. A possible 
explanation is by Burkart et al. (1997) that larger percentage of ownership by a blockholder 
can do harm to managerial incentives to search for new investment opportunities. 
 
Appendix: What’s different about banks 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of concentrated ownership on valuation of banks rather 
than firms in other industries. We do so because banks are different from firms in other 
industries in at least six aspects (Laeven, 2013). Thus corporate governance in banks is more 
complicated than in nonfinancial firms. 
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The six aspects that make banks different from nonfinancial firms are: 
1. Banks have much higher leverage ratio. 
2. Loan quality makes banks more opaque. 
3. Banks have diffuse debt (depositors). 
4. There is maturity mismatch between banks’ assets and liabilities. 
5. Banks are large creditors to the real economy. 
6. Banks are systemically important and heavily regulated. 
 
Firstly, banks have much higher leverage ratio, which is approximately 10, than most 
nonfinancial firms. Flannery (1994) documents in his paper that, in nonfinancial firms, the 
average leverage ratio is approximately 1 at the end of 1990. Because it is creditors who bear 
more of the downside risk in case of leverage, higher leverage induces more risk-taking. Also, 
high leverage induces bank owner’s risk-shifting behavior: owners of the highly leveraged 
banks tend to take more risk once debt has been sold than the depositors expected when 
they bought the debt, which, with no doubt, increases the riskiness of the bank. Moreover, 
as banks tend to conceal their incentive of risk-shifting behavior, it is harder to identify banks’ 
risk level. One particular regulatory instrument to prevent banks from taking excessive 
leverage is capital requirements. However, in some circumstances, banks are able to 
circumvent leverage rules through regulatory arbitrage. Also, minimum capital requirements 
are doubted to be set too low (e.g., Admati et al., 2010). To conclude, the implication of high 
leverage increases the bank failure probability and the threat of systemic risk, which makes 
the governance of banking industry more complex than nonfinancial firms. 
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Secondly, due to large informational asymmetries of loan quality, banks are judged to be 
more opaque than firms in other industries. On the one hand, opaqueness adds to banks’ 
riskiness. Only banks themselves possess detailed information about their borrowers’ credit 
condition and banks’ degree of monitoring borrowers’ credit. Given this information 
asymmetries of banks’ loan quality, banks can decide by themselves how much idiosyncratic 
risk to take in their loan portfolios without informing their creditors. So the easiness of 
outsiders’ judgment of the riskiness of a bank’s portfolio is mostly depend on banks’ own 
strategy towards loan portfolio. 
 
On the other hand, this opaqueness of banks’ asset quality provides opportunity to bank 
owners’ risk-shifting behavior. At the same time, the feature of high leverage gives banks 
incentives to shift risk. The resulting risk-shifting behavior not only conflicts with interests of 
banks’ debt holders but also harms the benefits of shareholders. Bank managers may gain 
private benefits from risk-shifting behavior. Such private benefits may include 
empire-building considerations (Jensen, 1986), short-term gains associated with executive 
compensation contracts, fraud and outright looting (Akerlof & Romer, 1993), and lending to 
related parties (Laeven, 2001; La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa, 2003). 
 
However, opaque asset quality is not unique to the banking industry. R&D-intensive 
industries can also be opaque. Take pharmaceutical industry as an example, it requires 
substantial investments to develop a new product, and these investments should withstand 
highly uncertain outcome and long gestation period, which presents the opaqueness about 
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the input and return of this industry. Nonetheless, the opaqueness of banks is still different 
from nonfinancial firms, because as mentioned above, by the combination of high leverage 
and opaque asset quality, banks has both the opportunity and strong incentives to take 
excessive risk. Further, trading activities of banks may also contribute to banks’ opaqueness. 
Trading activities in financial system including complex financial instruments are harder to 
measure and verify. Associated risk profiles and trading positions can be easily changed in 
real time, thus additional risk is created, harder to measure than nonfinancial firms. 
 
Thirdly, the debts of a bank contain a large fraction of deposits taken from numerous diffuse 
depositors. Generally, these diffuse deposits are from household savings, which could not 
bear much risk. So these risk-adverse debt holders would seek deposit insurance to protect 
their deposits when their assets seem to be confronted with probable risk, i.e. liquidity risk.    
 
Fourthly, maturity mismatch is also a specific feature of banks. Usually, a large part of debts 
sold by banks are short-term, while their assets tend to be longer term. Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) argue that such debt-asset maturity mismatch increases banks’ liquidity risk and bank 
runs. 
 
Together, the risk concern of diffuse depositors and liquidity risk created by banks’ 
debt-asset mismatch give the rationale for deposit insurance. Small depositors who exert 
deposit insurance can impair the monitoring incentive of creditors to banks, thus weaken the 
monitoring role in contrast to nonfinancial firms. In turn, weak corporate governance can 
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lead to poor liquidity risk management, increasing the probability for financial fragility. For 
example, as documented by Diamond and Rajan (2012), banks may make excessive liquidity 
commitments to creditors to finance illiquid assets when facing fierce competition. 
 
The fifth feature of banks is that they are large creditors to the real economy. For example, 
banks play the roles of major investors in countries such as Germany and Japan, therefore 
they have major incentive and responsibility to conduct corporate governance to the broader 
economy. Based on this, corporate governance of banks can have extensive influence on the 
real economy. If banks play poor corporate governance themselves, it is unlikely that banks 
would promote sound corporate governance in the firms they have partial ownerships in, 
which, in a broader sense, means allocation of capital will not be optimized. 
 
What really makes banks distinguished from other companies is the sixth feature: banks are 
subject to deposit insurance and heavy regulation, for example: ownership, capital 
requirement, and activity and entry restrictions. Deposit insurance and financial regulations 
can negatively affect the traditional governance mechanisms of banks. 
 
Depositor insurance, in need by diffuse depositors to protect their assets, can damage the 
incentives of depositors to monitor banks and displace market discipline, potentially 
impeding corporate governance. Further, although deposit insurance is effective in 
preventing bank runs, aiming at banks that transform short-term debts into long-term claims, 
the moral hazard stemming from it gives managers and shareholders an incentive to take 
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excessive risks, thus displacing market discipline to some extent. As Macey and O’Hara (2003) 
point out, the moral hazard comes this way: Deposit insurance allows banks to shift risks and 
associated losses to other banks, and possibly it could be taxpayers who pay off debts of 
failed banks at last. Also, the fact that underpriced deposit insurance premiums are 
unrelated to an individual bank’s contribution to systemic risk adds to the motivation of 
managers and shareholders’ risk shifting. 
 
Because of the displacement of market discipline caused by the presence of deposit 
insurance, prudential regulations take place to monitor the behavior of managers and 
shareholders of banks, originally intended to safeguard financial stability (Bhattacharya, Boot 
and Thakor, 1998). However, the prudential regulations may create new distortions and bring 
negative influence to financial stability, and as for banks, the ability of investors’ control may 
be weakened and bank valuation could be reduced (Laeven and Levine, 2009). To extend, 
natural forms of bank governance may be prevented and traditional governance channels 
may turn ineffective because of restrictions imposed by prudential regulations. For example, 
the takeover restrictions and activity restrictions from prudential regulations may cause the 
market for corporate control being less effective. 
 
In conclusion, high leverage gives incentive for risk-shifting, while opaqueness provide 
opportunities to shift risk, together adding to banks’ riskiness and increasing the bank failure 
probability and the threat of systemic risk. Moreover, maturity mismatch increases banks’ 
liquidity risk and bank runs, and the resulting behavior of exerting deposit insurance by 
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diffuse depositors would weaken the monitoring role of debt holders of banks. In addition, 
deposit insurance and prudential regulations alter the traditional channels of banks’ 
corporate governance. All above increase the complexity and uniqueness of banks’ 
governance. And this gives reason to the significance of our research in the impact of 
concentrated ownership, as one of the most effective bank governance mechanisms, on 
valuation of banks in particular. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Number of banks in our sample by year 
 
Year Number of banks 
1996 58 
1997 55 
1998 62 
1999 61 
2000 68 
2001 66 
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Table 2 
Number of blockholders 
 
Number of blockholders Frequency   
0 126 
1 112 
2 94 
3 21 
4 13 
5 2 
6 2 
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Table 3 
Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
  
Tobin’s Q (market value of equity + book value of liabilities) / book value of 
assets 
  
Market-to-book market value of equity / book value of equity 
  
Numblks number of all blockholders 
  
Sumblks percentage of shares held by all blockholders 
  
Size Log(total assets) 
  
Capital equity / total assets 
  
Loans loans / total earning assets 
  
Asset diversity 
1 − |
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 − 𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
| 
  
Deposits deposits / total assets 
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Table 4 
Summary statistics 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25th 50th 75th 
Dependent variables       
Tobin’s Q 370 1.176 0.296 1.075 1.121 1.190 
Market-to-book 370 2.827 1.359 1.939 2.445 3.319 
       
Blockholder variables       
Numblks 370 1.181 1.153 0.000 1.000 2.000 
Sumblks 370 11.379 13.830 0.000 7.710 14.660 
       
Control variables       
Size 370 16.967 1.264 16.006 16.823 17.702 
Capital 370 0.091 0.069 0.074 0.082 0.093 
Loans 369 0.741 0.133 0.709 0.760 0.814 
Asset diversity 369 0.477 0.174 0.366 0.470 0.574 
Deposits 370 0.694 0.199 0.639 0.735 0.830 
 
Notes: Please see Table 2 for definition of variables. 
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Table 5 
Correlation matrix 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Tobin’s Q 1.0000      
(2) Market-to-book 0.6945* 1.0000     
(3) Numblks 0.1749* 0.1165  1.0000    
(4) Sumblks 0.0984  -0.0083  0.7575* 1.0000   
(5) Size -0.2261* -0.0591  -0.2274* -0.2074* 1.0000  
(6) Capital 0.8647* 0.3411* 0.1823* 0.1620* -0.2908* 1.0000 
(7) Loans -0.4294* -0.1669* -0.0402  -0.0557  0.2668* -0. 4615* 
(8) Asset diversity -0.1860* -0.1249  -0.0562  -0.0523  -0.2189* -0. 1915* 
(9) Deposits -0.2454* -0.1978* 0.0695  0.0632  -0.5721* -0. 1406* 
 
  (7) (8) (9) 
(7) Loans 1.0000   
(8) Asset diversity -0.6375* 1.0000  
(9) Deposits 0.2794* 0.0385  1.0000 
     
 
Notes: This table reports the pair-wise correlations among variables in the sample. * 
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Please see Table 2 for definition of variables. 
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Table 6 
Regression results 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Tobin’s Q Market-to-book 
   
Numblks 0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.282*** 
(0.084) 
   
Sumblks -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
   
Size -0.028** 
(0.013) 
-0.158* 
(0.092) 
   
Capital 3.302*** 
(0.619) 
3.968* 
(2.350) 
   
Loans -0.143 
(0.122) 
-0.901 
(1.457)  
   
Asset diversity -0.159* 
(0.081) 
-1.177 
(0.835)  
   
Deposits -0.271*** 
(0.083) 
-1.482* 
(0.775) 
   
Observations 369 369 
R-squared 0.794 0.251 
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Notes: This table presents the main regression results. Both regressions also include 
year-fixed effects but their coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Please see Table 2 for definition of variables. 
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Table 7 
Robustness checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Numblks 0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.009) 
     
Sumblks -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
     
Size  -0.024*** 
(0.009) 
-0.023*** 
(0.009) 
-0.022** 
(0.010) 
     
Log (total operating 
income) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
  
 
  
       
Capital 3.408*** 
(0.605) 
4.069*** 
(0.167) 
4.079*** 
(0.157) 
4.123*** 
(0.243) 
     
Loans -0.200 
(0.123) 
-0.048 
(0.099) 
-0.061 
(0.100) 
-0.030 
(0.105) 
     
Asset diversity -0.157* 
(0.081) 
-0.069 
(0.073) 
-0.072 
(0.074) 
-0.061 
(0.075) 
     
Deposits -0.193** 
(0.078) 
-0.302*** 
(0.064) 
-0.305*** 
(0.064) 
-0.304*** 
(0.069) 
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Growth in assets  0.055 
(0.035) 
  
     
Growth in loans   0.052 
(0.032) 
 
     
Observations 369 262 262 245 
R-squared 0.789 0.878 0.878 0.736 
 
Notes: This table presents additional regression results. In column (1), we use an alternative 
measure of bank size. In column (2) and (3), we include growth in assets and loans, 
respectively, to control for growth opportunities. In column (4), we exclude bank-year 
observations in which the bank grows its assets by more than 50% in that year. In all the 
regressions, the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The results are qualitatively similar when 
the dependent variable is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value equity. All 
regressions also include year-fixed effects but their coefficients are not reported. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please see Table 2 for definition of variables. 
